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Moral Addicts 
ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM St. John's University 
Father believes in his own righteousness, whereas you and I and 
other human beings are imbued with the feeling that we consist 
of errors and efforts of the Jost souls. I commiserate with people 
like father-in my heart of hearts I cannot be angry with him-
because I think they are more unhappy than I. Why do I think 
them unhappy?-because the good within them is wrongly 
applied, so that it acts like evil-because the light within them is 
black and spreads darkness, obscurity around them. 
Letter from Vincent Van Gogh to his brother Theo1 
Any good ethical theory aspires to provide as comprehensive a guide to 
moral value and motivation as possible. Within modern moral philoso-
phy, conceptions of moral value have been dominated largely by consid-
erations of justice and concerns for the common good, and moral short-
comings have been accounted for primarily by appeal to ignorance, 
weakness, indifference or outright hostility to moral values. Yet the ways 
in which we fall short are far more complicated. By discussing one inter-
esting example here, I hope to provide some support for the claim that 
our conceptions of moral value and motivation need enrichment. In mak-
ing my case, I utilize a character who is more like a caricature than a fig-
ure from ordinary life. This touch of hyperbole is deliberate. Reflect for a 
moment on the function of a good cartoon caricature. By exaggerating 
physical features, it draws our attention to characteristics that go unno-
ticed in their normal context. Whereas cartoon caricatures aim at amuse-
ment, my goal is to distil some of our perceptions of moral excellence. 
The Moral Addict 
Imagine Ajax, a character with fairly normal roots. His parents did their 
best to inculcate a variety of attitudes and dispositions in their son, and 
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for the most part they were successful. For instance, Ajax tells the truth, 
keeps his word, plays fair, stands up for his beliefs, loves his siblings, 
shares with others, sympathizes with the unfortunate and generally 
respects people. He is just the sort of decent person most of us can claim 
as a friend or neighbour. Or at least this is what he is like before he under-
goes a moral metamorphosis. Ajax emerges as an unparalleled crusader 
against want and injustice, someone with an acute sensitivity to suffering 
and oppression. Indeed, Ajax comes to possess the moral equivalent of 
his martial counterpart's special "night-vision" goggles: where others see 
nothing suspicious on the moral landscape, Ajax spies moral squalor 
with uncanny perspicuity and then expertly exposes and eradicates it. 
Some account of the genesis of Ajax's metamorphosis is necessary to 
fully appreciate the nature of his character and commitments. Philoso-
phy, or at least philosophical reflection, plays a major role in his conver-
sion. One point strikes him over and over again in his study of moral phi-
losophy: the ethical leap from a personal point of view to a detached, 
impartial, "God's Eye" perspective. Eventually he takes this leap, and as 
he sees it, his life and character are forever altered. He comes to see the 
fundamental equality of all human beings in a completely different light 
and with a new appreciation. From this perspective, he sees the needs and 
rights of each and every person as literally indistinguishable. And given 
the overwhelming needs of the world's poor and its victims of injustice, 
he concludes that life's pre-eminent moral mission must be to bring com-
fort to these poor souls. 
Unlike so many academic philosophers, Ajax's commitment to this 
mission goes beyond an intellectual one. Rather, he commits himself body 
and soul to this cause, sparing no effort in the struggle. Whether it be 
Oxfam or Amnesty International, he lives and breathes to make the world 
a better place. As one might expect, such a crusade effects dramatic 
changes in Ajax's life. For one thing, he no longer finds it easy to make 
time for family and old friends. For their part, they do their best to under-
stand and "forgive" the dominating passion that comes between them, 
especially since they admire and respect his cause. But as you might 
expect, these ties become more and more attenuated and distant, until the 
time comes when Ajax's former life and connections are little more than 
a dim memory. 
The tension that Ajax first experienced when abandoning old commit-
ments and attachments gradually dissipates and ultimately disappears. 
The end result is an Ajax whose inclinations are as resolutely fixed upon 
his mission as is the intellect which led him to his vocation in the first 
place. Ajax's moral commitments suffuse every facet of his life and being. 
He views everything through the moral prism of his crusade. For example, 
when considering things like haute cuisine, elegant clothing, beautiful 
architecture or finely crafted objects, he immediately concludes that the 
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energy and resources devoted to such pursuits might be put to far better 
use. Neither can he hear people extol the talents, charms, grace, beauty or 
intelligence of the fortunate without wincing for the less fortunate. Ajax 
is also ever on the alert for subtle forms of racism, sexism and other types 
of discrimination. He assiduously polices his own words, demeanour and 
body language so as to ferret out the most minute vestiges of unfairness 
and prejudice. He even goes so far as to jettison elements of sarcasm and 
cynicism from his repertoire of humour because these elements could 
conceivably offend or depress people. Indeed, Ajax is perpetually "on 
call" where suffering is concerned. He eschews recreation, sports and the 
arts, nominally because they are a distraction from the serious business 
at hand, but the truth is that he feels no distracting temptations since he 
lives for his cause. And like Mahatma Gandhi, another famous fighter 
against want and injustice, Ajax carefully avoids all special, intimate 
attachments in favour of forging an egalitarian attachment to all human 
beings as such. 
As Ajax wages his holy war, he laments the dearth of loyal soldiers in 
the struggle against evil. He knows only too well that even those who 
share his mission lack his focus and resolve. Unlike Ajax, they are pulled 
in many directions by conflicting commitments. While so much of his life 
is spent judging his own fidelity to moral mandates, Ajax is careful not to 
judge others openly or too harshly. He fully realizes that his path is a most 
difficult one, and he has absolutely no interest in driving off part-time 
crusaders or making them feel bad for their less than total devotion. 
From his point of view, all that matters is the eradication of evil, and he 
is grateful for any assistance, even if he gets less than he would get in a 
more ideal world. 
From time to time, colleagues half-jokingly ask Ajax just what he would 
do with his life were he to ever succeed in his mission and put himself out 
of business, so to speak. Equal measures of respect and a sincere inability 
to imagine Ajax doing anything eise motivate these queries. Ajax's 
response is always that this is something he will never have to "worry" 
about. Even if all unnecessary suffering were eradicated- say, if we uni-
versally respected each other and shared the earth's resources equitably-
opportunities to comfort and heal would still abound, since as much 
human misery stems from the basic human condition as stems from the-
oretically eliminable vice. A utopia would still suffer from sickness, infir-
mity, old age, disappointment, loneliness and death. Thus, since Ajax 
knows that even a morally perfect world could always use someone will-
ing and able to take charity to the maximum, he rests secure that his life 
could never be rendered meaningless. 
Ajax is fully aware of his moral accomplishments, but he is modest in 
the sense that he does not dwell on them. Ajax is too busy to wallow in 
any self-absorbed contemplation of his own perceived goodness. While 
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his one true joy in life is doing and being good, he lives to really and truly 
eradicate evil, rather than to derive psychological satisfaction from bask-
ing in any conception of himself as a crimefighter par excellence. 
Kantian and Utilitarian Reactions to Ajax 
With this picture of Ajax in hand, let us consider how a Kantian might 
respond. At first glance, Ajax appears to be the epitome of the good 
Kantian moral agent who evinces an impartial respect for equally worthy 
rational beings. But we must be careful not to take actions at face value. 
For instance, respectful as Ajax's life may seem, he must be sure to carry 
out his crusade in a way that does not undermine his own dignity or the 
dignity of those he serves. If he lives a life of service because he sees his 
own life as worthless (or worth less), then his devotion is seriously tainted: 
The same is true if he "helps" others in a way that clearly undermines 
their autonomy or self-respect. Likewise, he must not use his unparalleled 
fidelity so as to bludgeon or browbeat others in a holier-than-thou fash-
ion. In all of these cases, the well-being of precious rational beings is dis-
regarded, and thus the spirit of the Kantian ideal of respect is dishonored. 
Presumably, Ajax could fall short on Kantian grounds even if he 
brought or intended to bring no harm to anyone. If Ajax is a kind of 
secret "moral athlete" who delights in competing against and defeating 
others in the race for the crown of pre-eminent virtue, then this could dis-
play a lack of regard for others with respect to what Kant saw as most 
vital in life, namely, moral goodness. If Ajax really cares equally about his 
fellow human beings, he should welcome their equal achievements when 
it comes to goodness. In much the same way, if Ajax is a "moral virtuoso" 
who lives to indulge in his own image of moral grandeur, then it would 
seem that he is interested in others only insofar as they represent an 
opportunity for a "fix" of self-infatuation. 
All of these cases raise interesting questions regarding supervening 
attitudes and motivations. In real life, our motives are seldom "pure" in 
the sense of having only one motive for anything we do. Barbara Herman 
has argued that Kant could allow for multiple motivations where moral 
worth is concerned so long as it were counterfactually true that an exist-
ing conception of duty would have been sufficient to move the agent to do 
the right action even in the absence of other motives.2 Herman's motive 
here is to rescue those imbued with both a sense of duty and pathological 
love from any Kantian reprimand based upon a lack of moral purity. 
However, some of the above cases have to do with situations where a per-
son could have an effective sense of duty and another motivation that 
runs along parallel lines, but that seems to off end against the very spirit 
of the Kantian moral ideal. I shall assume that a good Kantian could 
mount an argument to deal with such cases, though it is important to 
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note that this would have to involve allowing for the idea that unchosen 
feelings and attitudes can morally taint us. But I shall not depend much 
on this sort of argument here, since Ajax does not fit the above descrip-
tions. Let us stipulate that Ajax is someone with complete purity of 
motives: he lives and breathes to evince impartial respect for equally wor-
thy rational beings, and he is damn good at it. 
If Ajax's life and character are permissible and even praiseworthy from 
a Kantian point of view, the next question is whether they are morally 
mandatory. On one reading of Kant, what we might call the "side-con-
straint" interpretation, the answer would be negative. This interpretation 
paints the perfect duty of justice with its injunction to do no harm as the 
primary ethical concern. The rights of others function as side-constraints 
which limit the pursuit of our own good. The imperfect duty to help oth-
ers is depicted as a less stringent duty that confers moral worth, but that 
competes for attention with other concerns such as perfecting natural tal-
ents and capacities. Thus, this conception focusses first and foremost on 
respecting others by leaving them alone in various ways. 
Yet the more seriously we take the Kantian ideal of equality, the Jess 
plausible this side-constraint conception seems. If other people really 
count, then alleviating their suffering must be terribly important. Person-
ally avoiding the infliction of suffering cannot mean everything, morally 
speaking. And if other people count equally, then it is difficult to see how 
the perfection of non-moral talents and capacities could stack up for 
Kant when compared with eradicating injustice and want. After all, even 
though Kant never says that moral goodness counts for everything in life, 
he is clear that it counts most of all. Working against suffering and injus-
tice would not only manifest Ajax's commitment to respecting all fellow 
rational beings, but presumably it would maximize the opportunities for 
others to freely express their rational nature. Those who are starving or 
horribly oppressed are hardly prime candidates for living true to the 
moral law. 
In any case, the essential point so far as my analysis of Ajax is con-
cerned is that he merits Kant's unequivocal stamp of approval. Even if 
Kant would hesitate to endorse his life as a mandatory ideal, and I think 
that there are some good grounds for believing otherwise, there are no 
reasons to think that Kant would find anything morally lamentable about 
Ajax's life and character as I have described them. 
Now let us turn to utilitarianism. Even though Ajax seems like an ideal 
utilitarian, someone who maximizes happiness on a grand scale, we must 
be wary of employing simplistic conceptions of utilitarianism. To do jus-
tice to the theory, we might consider aspects of Mill's subtle version or a 
sophisticated consequentialist account like that of Peter Railton.3 These 
accounts avoid depicting pleasures as some type of unified "stuff" that is 
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easily quantified and mechanically compared. Moreover, they allow for 
the possibility that the world might be a better place in the long term if we 
were to mould ourselves into people with characters and dispositions 
which may sometimes preclude maximizing happiness in particular situa-
tions. For instance, perhaps it is true that the world is a better place 
because human beings form romantic attachments. And perhaps these 
attachments merit a place of highest honour in the pantheon of human 
pleasures. If it is also true that such attachments psychologically preclude 
being able to abandon loved ones whenever there is an opportunity to max-
imize happiness, then utilitarians can heartily endorse attachments and 
commitments that may sometimes work against maximizing happiness. 
With these considerations in mind, it should be easy to see how a util-
itarian might resist advocating Ajax's life as a universal ideal. For one 
thing, Ajax does miss out on all sorts of significant pleasures. And though 
it is true that a person like Ajax would provide many unfortunate souls 
with an opportunity to enjoy these pleasures, there is certainly something 
to the idea that the world would suffer important losses if everyone were 
to take up Ajax's cross. Moreover, despite the unlikelihood of everyone 
embracing the martyr's life (few exhibit this inclination) and the indisput-
able fact that a few moral zealots can often move moral mountains that 
need moving (people like Schweitzer, Gandhi and Mother Theresa do 
leave the world a better place), utilitarians can rightly alert us to the 
inherent risks in advocating and choosing the martyr's path. Who can tell 
in advance exactly who may be cut from the right cloth for this unusual, 
difficult life? Under conditions of uncertainty, surely it can make com-
plete sense to advocate maximizing happiness via more indirect, but also 
safer, mainstream routes. 
Yet these considerations can have little to do with Ajax, since he 
already has a proven track record as a moral crusader. There can be no 
doubts about his ability to perform at the vanguard in the struggle 
against evil on a grand scale. Whatever pleasures Ajax misses out on are 
more than compensated for in the lives of those he rescues. Furthermore, 
Ajax would insist that his life is complete and content, save for the suffer-
ing he cannot eliminate. As he sees it, all he needs are greater resources to 
pursue his precious mission. The last thing Ajax desires is a furlough of 
any kind from his moral battlefield. 
Thus, forms of indirect rule-utilitarianism that insist it is actually bet-
ter for us to be people whose day-to-day concerns are fairly parochial can 
find nothing morally amiss in Ajax, the exception to their rule. No matter 
how subtle or complex, any version of utilitarianism must ultimately 
come down to a matter of producing the best sum-total consequences for 
the world. And when the numbers are added up, no matter how difficult 
they may be to count, there seems to be little doubt that Ajax leaves the 
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world a better place than he would, were he to live more like the rest of 
us common folk. 
Saints or Addicts? 
Those familiar with Susan Wolf's provocative essay, "Moral Saints," may 
assume that I am driving toward similar conclusions.4 After all, my Ajax 
bears many similarities to her "rational" and "loving saints." In many 
respects, Ajax might even be thought of as someone who starts out as a 
rational saint and gradually evolves into a loving saint. And though I 
have refrained from arguing that perfect fidelity to a Kantian or utilitar-
ian moral theory would necessarily force you to live like Ajax the cru-
sader (as Wolf argues), we certainly agree that such a character misses 
something important, even if I have yet to say exactly what. However, we 
are driving toward very different conclusions. 
Essentially, Susan Wolf's essay aims at weakening our conceptual def-
erence to moral values. Of course, her worry is not that everyday people 
will be tempted to live the saint's life. She knows this is unlikely and she 
is plenty glad, since she believes that "a person can be perfectly wonderful 
without being perfectly moral."5 As she sees it, Kantian and utilitarian 
theories demand a limitless devotion which would either deform or 
squeeze out many of our most prized non-moral values. Interestingly 
enough, she does not see this as a criticism of these theories, or at least 
not so far as evaluating them as moral theories is concerned. According 
to Wolf, "The flaws of a perfect master of a moral theory need not reflect 
flaws in the intramoral content of the theory itself."6 Wolf concludes that 
to enjoy rich, complete lives-both individually and collectively-we 
must temper our fidelity to these theories, since they are only guides to 
moral goodness and not complete guides to life. Though she never dis-
cusses exactly how far from perfection we should allow ourselves to fall, 
presumably she has in mind something between sainthood and being a 
minimally decent Samaritan. The only other advice she can imagine 
would be to revise our conception of moral value in a more "Aristotelian" 
or "Nietzschean" way so as to include more non-moral values within the 
moral domain. But she rejects this alternative because" ... no matter how 
rich we make the life in which perfect obedience to this [moral] guide 
would result, we will have reason to hope that a person does not wholly 
rule or direct his life by the abstract and impersonal consideration that 
such a life would be morally good."7 Thus, even though Wolf wishes to 
protect us from morality in a key sense, she is content to leave these moral 
theories intact. 
An essential thing to notice about Wolf's conception of moral saint-
hood and Ajax is that they embrace excessively narrow conceptions of 
moral excellence. Wolf states that a "necessary condition of moral saint-
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hood be that one's life be dominated by a commitment to improving the 
welfare of others or of society as a whole."8 But notice that there is no 
such simple essence to moral excellence or dominant good at which 
morality aims. Unparalleled crusaders against want and injustice can still 
fail morally in other respects. Mahatma Gandhi surely suffered as a hus-
band and father, though this took nothing away from his prodigious 
moral achievements in other areas of his life. Much the same might be 
said for Martin Luther King. Rather than casting moral excellence 
entirely in terms of maximal devotion to impartial justice and universal 
benevolence (with "more is better" as the major criterion), it is far better 
to see moral goodness as a subtle integration of diverse and often con-
flicting ethical concerns. Those who are sons, daughters, siblings, friends, 
lovers, parents and colleagues in common causes, and who take these 
roles and their attending obligations seriously appreciate the kind of fine 
awareness and keen perception required to do justice to them all. What 
makes this enterprise so difficult is the fact that the various ethical claims 
we must confront in a normal human life are not variants of some one 
fundamental value, and neither are they capable of being ordered in any-
thing like a strict, mechanical hierarchy. 
Ironically, the moral/non-moral distinction that modern moral theo-
ries have promoted and that Wolf embraces with an eye to mapping out 
distinct spheres of practical concern actually encourages the very phe-
nomenon Wolf is combatting. This sharp line between moral and non-
moral values is usually conjoined with a conception of moral value 
fleshed out primarily in terms of what we owe "just anybody," and the 
entire package is wrapped in an aspiration to construct a decision proce-
dure which yields determinate, overriding answers to any moral quan-
dary. Even though Wolf rejects the idea that the mandates yielded by such 
a decision procedure must always trump other concerns, the conception 
of ethics she implicitly embraces is one that threatens the kind of commit-
ments she thinks make life worth living for most of us. 
It is crucial to recognize that this moral/non-moral distinction itself 
does not create the practical tensions and struggles in our lives. Our lives 
would be fraught with conflicts of value even if moral philosophers were 
to resist a strong moral/non-moral dichotomy. But a narrow conception 
of moral value conjoined with a penchant for a clear-cut decision proce-
dure in ethics dramatically increases the likelihood of an unhealthy fixa-
tion on a small number of concerns. Of course, people are likely to con-
centrate and excel in certain areas even with respect to ethical concerns. 
For example, we know all too well that being a good spouse or parent 
does not ensure that we will be good neighbours or citizens. Neither does 
being the very best Samaritan ensure that we will be good friends or lov-
ers. However, the important point here is that such deficiencies are genu-
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ine ones that cannot be corrected simply by compensating with an extra 
mile in our area of expertise. 
Some may object that we cannot risk blurring the moral/non-moral 
distinction without grave risks. So doing may leave us with no clear moral 
advice, or even worse, may encourage us to do things like ignore more 
"distant" people in favour of self and loved ones. These are reasonable 
fears. Nonetheless, we do ourselves a disservice by conceptually isolating 
a relatively small number of general rules designed to spell out impartial 
moral demands. We need to integrate these important concerns with a 
broad array of moral commitments that articulate a rich conception of 
what we regard as most beautiful, noble and worth wanting in life. 
Thus, it is no wonder that Wolf is led to the conclusion that moral 
excellence competes with living a rich, complete life. Were she to adopt 
the Aristotelian route she rejects, a route that avoids the ethical reduc-
tionism she implicitly embraces, a large part of this conflict would be tem-
pered at the very least. She dismisses this alternative because she assumes 
that moral assessments must be "abstract and impersonal," and that such 
a point of view would deform many of our most cherished commitments. 
She is absolutely right of course about the deforming effects of seeing our 
whole life through an abstract and impersonal lens. But many, if not 
most, everyday moral contexts involve very personal and concrete com-
mitments. For instance, my conception of my responsibilities as a spouse, 
parent, sibling, friend, colleague or neighbour are anything but abstract 
and impersonal. Though these bonds can be quite demanding, they are 
not usually seen as an oppressive yoke imposed from an alien "abstract 
and impersonal" point of view. Moreover, it is worth pointing out here 
that even though a large part of ethics concerns what we owe others, there 
is no reason to restrict our conception of ethics to this atone. Perhaps 
there are good reasons to do so where the law is concerned, but the law 
should not exhaust what we are trying to get at when addressing funda-
mental ethical questions like "How should I live?" and "What sort of per-
son should I be?" 
In this light, notice that what is so peculiar about Ajax is not just the 
fact that he lacks some of the virtues. The same can be said for most of 
us, and while this is significant, it is hardly news. To better understand 
Ajax's peculiarities, contrast him with other martyrs and Good Samari-
tans from real life. For instance, consider conscientious exemplars like 
Albert Schweitzer who purposely, self-consciously devote so much of 
their life to the less fortunate. Or consider decent people like the villagers 
of Le Chambon during World War II who may not have actively sought 
such opportunities, but who found it impossible to refuse aid to perse-
cuted Jewish refugees once confronted by their plight. Assisting these 
Jews entailed not only significant sacrifices but also grave risks to their 
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own safety. What is pertinent about these cases of heroism and sacrifice 
is that we do not usually find the extirpation of ethical concerns that we 
witness in Ajax's case. These people attempted to integrate many diverse 
ethical concerns within a single life, and, though some concerns inevita-
bly had to lose in the competition for limited attention (as is always the 
case), these concerns did not simply fade away into oblivion. Indeed, we 
expect mature moral agents to retain a subtle appreciation for what is lost 
whenever life regrettably forces us to choose between ethical loves. This 
kind of sensitivity is just as essential an element in sound ethical deliber-
ation as is the capacity to find the overall best choice. 
Ajax suffers from an addiction, though admittedly a very unusual one. 
Ajax is a kind of moral addict. And just as other addictions induce forms 
of practical myopia, Ajax's monomaniacal fixation on suffering and 
injustice causes him to completely lose sight of everything else. He does 
not simply dismiss other ethical concerns as less important. As Ajax sees 
things, there are no other concerns to compete for his fidelity. While he is 
correct to believe that he will never find himself without work, the tragedy 
here is that Ajax's life would be empty were this ever to happen. Under 
what ought to be conditions ripe for human ftourishing-i.e., the eradi-
cation of pervasive suffering and injustice, thereby freeing Ajax to par-
take of all the joys life has to offer-Ajax would be left with nothing. And 
though this is not to suggest that Ajax wants these ills to exist so that he 
can have them to fight against (if this is so, then Ajax is troubling in a dif-
ferent way), the fact remains that Ajax can experience joy only by waging 
his crusade. Even were Ajax unequivocably correct in devoting himself 
entirely to his cause, surely there is something lamentable about a person 
whose vision and imagination have been narrowed in such a way as to 
render him oblivious to innumerable sources of human value. 
Hence, just what should we say about Ajax, whose addiction blinds him 
to genuine ethical concerns and numbs his capacity to appreciate compet-
ing ethical loves? Since his preoccupation with human suffering is not 
born from any objectionable motivations, and since he leaves the world a 
better place, can we say that Ajax is a bad person? In answering this ques-
tion, we must be careful not to exhaust moral assessment in terms of 
adjudicating guilt and innocence. In Ajax's case, we can stop short of say-
ing that his desire for goodness goes bad, but we can still insist that he suf-
fers from a serious lack of moral vision, imagination and appreciation. 
Though Ajax is a thoroughly conscientious person, his conception of 
moral value lacks the richness we desire in flesh-and-blood moral agents. 
Even if Ajax never does the wrong thing by opting for his crusade (and 
notice that there are likely to be at least some parochial obligations he 
cannot avoid by choice-e.g., natural obligations to parents and siblings), 
the absence of any significant conflicts in Ajax's deliberations is itself a 
morally lamentable shortcoming in his character. 
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In assessing people like Ajax, we also need to pay attention to the cir-
cumstances that bred their moral addiction. Those who are forced to con-
front pervasive suffering on an everyday basis may eventually find it 
impossible to think of little else. The threat of moral desensitization 
looms as a constant danger to us all. Indeed, the unfortunate truth may 
be that under certain tragic circumstances, some measure of desensitiza-
tion may prove necessary in order to further worthwhile moral causes in 
a resolute fashion. If so, then we have good reasons to temper our judg-
ments about these unfortunate souls even while we unequivocally lament 
the loss that their metamorphosis involves. Ajax is not a bad person, and 
he is an exemplar in certain respects, but he is far from everything we 
desire in a moral agent. Notice that we can say this even if we scarcely 
blame him for his malady. 
I began this essay by referring to Ajax as a kind of caricature. Therefore 
the question of relevance to real life naturally arises. After all, we do not 
come across people exactly like Ajax very often. Most of us are far more 
likely to ignore suffering and injustice in favour of more local concerns. 
Ordinary people do not seem to need any special warning in order to steer 
clear of Ajax's addiction. Thus, if Ajax's addiction is so unusual, perhaps 
he is just a straw man. 
Yet, even if Ajax were a grossly exaggerated caricature, he would still 
serve a useful purpose if he alerts us to the dangers of a dichotomous view 
that places a rich, well-lived life on one side and moral goodness on the 
other: Ajax and Wolf's conception of moral value bites off too small a 
piece of life for designation as "morally" significant. An enriched under-
standing of moral value cannot ensure a good life for any of us, but at 
least it can allow us to see a much broader array of commitments as inte-
gral elements within a conception of human flourishing. This can help us 
to avoid casting morality as an alienating force bent on keeping us from 
living well. 
Moreover, I would question whether Ajax's "disease" is really so 
uncommon, even if few people exhibit as bad a dose of the "sickness." I 
for one have met real-life characters who parallel this caricature to some 
degree. Consider a particular brand of philosopher, one who has assumed 
the dirty job of being the "conscience" of the world. This "person of prin-
ciple" may eventually come to see every choice and action as suffused 
with profound moral gravity. Thoroughly embroiled in the effort to make 
students and colleagues alike realize that the world is rife with suffering 
and injustice, this person may be consumed by the vocation of showing 
people the moral light. Meeting with ignorance and indifference, this fig-
ure may interpret this as a mandate to press on that much harder. Indeed, 
this crusader may leave no stone unturned in the effort to enlighten peo-
ple about the moral ramifications of seemingly innocent actions, words 
and ways of life. From afar, such people are likely to engender profound 
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respect and admiration, especially if their efforts transcend the classroom 
and written page, and if they venture out into the trenches. But in the 
flesh, such people are often disappointing, and may even strike us as inhu-
man in certain respects. We are likely to feel a twinge of guilt and even 
self-suspicion for reacting this way, as we hurry to remind ourselves that 
these are good people doing good things for the right reasons. 
How is it then that a close-up look at these people can sometimes leave 
us cold? As Van Gogh suggests with respect to his father in the opening 
quotation of this essay, I suspect that we sense a very subtle warping of 
goodness in these upright people. Van Gogh expresses the idea that most 
of us are "imbued with the feeling that we consist of errors and efforts of 
the lost souls." One way of understanding this idea is to remember that 
the richness and diversity of our moral values condemns us to a life filled 
with ethical tradeoffs and compromises. Try as we might to pursue 
unequivocally good ends in an upright way, we are bound to forsake cher-
ished things as we choose between conflicting loves. We can never be com-
pletely clean, and mature moral agency requires an acknowledgement of 
this fact on our parts. 9 But by the same token, we must also remember that 
our lives and our conception of ethics are not only concerned with what 
is bad, base and unworthy. The capacity to appreciate and encourage what 
is most beautiful and noble about a human life and character is every bit 
as important as a subtle sensitivity to suffering and injustice. We must 
take great care lest we lose the former in our pursuit of the latter. The 
moral addict I have described unwittingly succumbs to this temptation. 
Perhaps the greatest irony here is that the very desire for goodness can 
itself go bad in various ways and to various degrees. This is bound to be 
a disturbing thought to all of us, but particularly to Kantians who would 
like to believe that goodness is always to be had so long as our will is res-
olute. My suggestion is that Kantian respect and utilitarian concerns for 
collective well-being constitute important elements of moral goodness, 
but they are only pieces of a rich, complex moral mosaic. And as with any 
good mosaic, great care must be taken not only to collect all the necessary 
pieces, but also to place them in the proper relation to each other. Other-
wise the mosaic will be incomplete at best and, in the extreme, virtually 
unrecognizable. Ultimately, we do best to think of ourselves as artists who 
must ply our trade-where this business is the business of living-with 
fine awareness, keen perception, rich imagination and loving attentive-
ness to all the values that make up this moral mosaic. Moral addicts suf-
fer from a diminished capacity to appreciate the richness of this mosaic. 10 
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